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The PUC's Electricity Deregulation Proposals:
Point/Counterpoint
INTRODUCTION
by Robert C. Fellmeth
n April 24, 1994, the California
UPublic Utilities Commission (PUC)
. issued its Order Instituting Inves-
tigation and Rulemaking to restructure the
electricity industry. The order represented
the culmination of two years of study, and
was based on three underlying judgments:
- "Command-and-control" and "cost-
of-service" regulation and "central plan-
ning" have become obsolete in an "increas-
ingly competitive electric services mar-
ket."
- California's private power utilities
charge some of the highest rates in the
nation.
- The Commission has (successfully)
used enhanced competition in other areas
of regulation, including telecommunica-
tions.
The PUC's initial order also criticized
the disincentive to new investment caused
by cost-of-service regulation, the "burden-
some administrative proceedings" (of the
PUC), and "unnecessary" barriers to pub-
lic participation in its proceedings.
Electricity utilities have long been
considered "natural monopolies" requir-
ing maximum rate regulation. The high
threshold costs necessary to create a util-
ity meant that there was room for only one
entrepreneur to operate efficiently. Because
a single (monopoly) enterprise was inevi-
table, government regulation to preclude
excessive prices and other abuses of mo-
nopoly power was compelled. But as U.S.
District Judge Harold Greenes decision
in the AT&T telecommunications case
indicated, it may be possible to take that
portion of a utility enterprise where "there
is room for only one" and confine the
utility to it, leaving the remainder of the
enterprise subject to competition. In tele-
communications, this was accomplished
by narrowing the highly regulated utility
to the wire and switches constituting the
"loop" which gets the phone signal to a
home, and allowing competition in the
transmission of signals by microwave
where there is room for many competi-
tors.
In electricity, the same principle may
apply where one confines close regulation
to the network bringing in the power, but
allows competition in power generation
-where many competitors may flourish.
Hence, utility deregulation involves al-
lowing many separate companies to gen-
erate electricity and contribute it to the
"grid"-or system of transmission wires.
This "grid" remains a monopoly which
distributes (or "wheels") this power to
customers for a fair charge.
The transformation of utilities from
regulated to partially competitive raises
the following common concerns: (1) prior
regulation has often cross-subsidized
some groups (the elderly or poor), which
may not be as achievable with wider
competition; (2) regulators are currently
able to accommodate "external costs" (for
example, encouraging energy conserva-
tion to extend nonrenewable resources
for societal gain), which may also not be
achievable easily with deregulation; (3)
some customers are inherently organized
and possess strong bargaining power vis-
a-vis others (for example, industrial vs.
residential users); (4) where the remain-
ing utility enterprise is allowed to par-
ticipate in the new competitive sector, it
will use its remaining monopoly power
to unfair advantage; and (5) the compet-
itive sector is often subject to standard
antitrust offenses which are not monitor-
ed or prosecuted because of the presence
of a regulator committed to "non-inter-
ference."
Notwithstanding commonly cited con-
cers, neither utilities nor consumers have
categorically opposed deregulation. Each
of the five problems listed above is ad-
dressable through legislation or through
the details of remaining regulation. How-
ever, where historical monopoly power
has been subject to deregulation (as in air
transportation, telecommunications, and
cable television), serious abuses have oc-
curred-for example, failure to apply an-
titrust law (air transport), refusal to limit
monopoly power participation and distor-
tion of the new competitive sector (tele-
communications), and statutory inability to
control egregious practices by the monop-
oly enterprise (cable television). Accord-
ingly, the details of deregulation deter-
mine whether enhanced efficiencies will
occur, and whether new abuses will evolve
from a pendulum-swing overreliance on
the "market" without antitrust or fair com-
petition oversight where still needed.
The basic structure of the Commis-
sion's proposal is consistent with a trend
to separate power generation from trans-
mission. Part of that trend was reflected
in the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978 (PURPA) and the Energy
Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct). The PURPA
statute allows for contribution to the grid
by power generators, and their required
compensation by utilities. The EPAct sev-
ered the automatic control of utilities over
the power transmitted by their networks; it
authorized the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to require utilities to
"provide wholesale transmission service."
And in 1991, FERC approved the "West-
em Systems Power Pool" established by
utilities to facilitate sale or trade of power
between them.
Electricity deregulation-as originally
proposed by the PUC in April 1994-
would allow power consumers to contract
directly with power generators. The orig-
inal concept was to allow consumer choice
to either remain with the existing utility,
or to make alternative arrangements with
power generators or with "brokers" for
such generators. This plan anticipated
"retail wheeling," where large industrial
users, then commercial consumers, and
finally households (in separate stages)
would be permitted to contract directly
with power producers, and the utilities
would simply collect a fee for use of the
grid to transmit the power to the user.
Consumers could choose to remain users
of the utility's own power generation,
and would be subject to PUC rate review
protection.
The PUC also proposed to initiate an-
other policy called "performance-based
ratesetting," which could be implemented
together with or separately from retail
wheeling. Here, the utility's maximum
price would be set based on the average
price of electricity. To the extent the util-
ity is able to produce (or purchase from
others) cheaper electricity and beat the
l
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average price, the savings are divided be-
tween ratepayers and stockholders. If the
utility becomes less efficient, the losses
would also be split between ratepayers
and stockholders.
The difficulty for utilities under both
of these proposals is the fate of existing
and inefficient powerplants. The utilities
seek a return on existing and sunk in-
vestment, which gives them a bias to use
costly power generation where they can
pass those higher costs on to consumers.
Retail wheeling and performance-based
ratemaking are each intended to provide
a market incentive to generate or find elec-
tricity generation more cheaply. Thus, the
PUC's initial proposal won the backing
of some utilities by requiring ratepayers
to pay for much of the costs of retiring
uneconomic generators.
The initial reaction to the PUC's orig-
inal proposal included objections and con-
cems, and generated the following ques-
tions:
- Will the phase-in of industrial, then
commercial, and then residential custom-
ers lead to industrial "skimming of the
cream" of the best and cheapest power,
with residential users getting what's left?
What will be left for residential users-
who have little ability to bargain among
providers-except high-cost power from
inefficient, outmoded plants?
- What will happen in the proposed
system to needed cross-subsidies which
assist low-income ratepayers in securing
basic services?
- What will happen to the state's in-
terest in long-run consequences as reflect-
ed in policies stimulating conservation,
power from renewable sources, and pol-
lution control? Utilities are currently re-
quired to obtain a percentage of their pow-
er from environmentally sound sources;
will that societal interest be sacrificed for
immediate energy gratification? What
would happen to fledgling biomass gen-
eration (the burning of discarded plant
material-the largest source of landfill
trash) for electricity?
Since April 1994, the Commission has
been holding hearings throughout the state
on its proposal, and fencing with both
FERC and the state legislature about its
jurisdictional prerogatives.
Consumer groups, including two of
the state's leading representatives of util-
ity consumers-Toward Utility Rate Nor-
malization (TURN) and Utility Consum-
ers' Action Network (UCAN), have been
particularly critical of the details of the
Commission's electricity deregulation
plan. TURN presented an alternative plan,
termed "Community Access to Compet-
itive Energy," to the Commission in Sep-
tember 1994; TURN's plan included the
following elements: (I) cities, counties,
and other local authorities would be au-
thorized to set up "consumer-owned util-
ities" to purchase power transmission and
distribution services from utilities at regu-
lated prices (choosing their own sources of
power); (2) rates for participating subscrib-
ers would be set by the authority, as would
any cross-subsidies for conservation and
nonrenewable resources; and (3) utilities
would be phased out entirely as producers
of power and confined to transmission.
Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) em-
braced the PUC's initial plan in its broad
outline. Southern California Edison, how-
ever, bitterly opposed it and-together
with San Diego Gas & Electric Com-
pany-proposed an alternative now dub-
bed "PoolCo." Under the utilities' alter-
native, the Commission would create a
statewide "wholesale pool" of power by
1997, and at the same time implement
its "performance-based ratemaking" pro-
posal. The energy combine would be ac-
cessible only by industrial users for two
years, after which households would
have the chance to participate. The con-
cept is to create a private, independent
vehicle for the marketing of power sep-
arate from utility carriers.
Following six days of PUC full-panel
hearings and its review of comments sub-
mitted by 140 parties and hundreds of in-
dividuals in 16 public participation hear-
ings over the past year, a three-member
majority of the Commission now favors
the "PoolCo" alternative. On May 24, 1995,
the PUC released for public comment two
alternative proposals-the original plan
(now sponsored by Commissioner Jessie J.
Knight, Jr.) and "PoolCo" (favored by
PUC President Daniel Wm. Fessler and
Commissioners P. Gregory Conlon and
Henry Duque).
We present below a defense and cri-
tique, respectively, of the new "PoolCo"
conceptual plan now being advanced by
the Commission. The defense of "PoolCo"
is authored by Jim Conran, with a back-
ground as a utility executive (with Pa-
cific Bell), public official (director of the
California Department of Consumer Af-
fairs), candidate for Insurance Commis-
sioner, and now president of Orinda-based
Consumers First, a coalition of Califor-
nia ratepayers. The critique is written by
Audrie Krause, until recently the execu-
tive director of TURN.
POINT:
Consumers Should Be
Turned On By "PoolCo"
by Jim Conran
alifornians may not be aware of
what is happening in San Fran-
cisco, but-if all goes according to
plan-electricity consumers in the state
soon will benefit by an innovative policy
proposed in May by the California Public
Utilities Commission (PUC). The pro-
posal, which would allow consumers to
purchase electricity from a provider other
than the utility currently monopolizing the
area, reflects two recent trends in current
public policymaking-facilitating an or-
derly transition from monopolies to a
competitive marketplace, and represent-
ing the interests of all consumers over the
concerns of large, special-interest parties.
Through the creation of a power pool
which would dispense the lowest-cost
power first, the PUC will establish a com-
petitive market within the electric utility
industry which will result in lower electric-
ity rates for consumers. The current PUC
proposal thus meets the two primary goals
established initially by the PUC-lower
electricity rates and a choice of electricity
suppliers for consumers. Under the plan,
California private utilities such as Pacific
Gas & Electric, San Diego Gas & Electric,
and Southern California Edison would be
forced to compete against each other for
the opportunity to deliver the lowest price
to the pool. Then, they will have the right
to directly serve, via the pool, consumers
throughout the state.
In business, it is a generally agreed-
upon principle that competition encour-
ages lower prices; therefore, the PUC
plan will result in lower electricity prices
for all California consumers. However,
this proposal is beneficial to consumers
because of how they will benefit and be-
cause of how detrimental the other alter-
natives would be. Under the present sce-
nario of providing electrical power to con-
sumers, Californians are restricted to a
designated electrical provider based upon
their residence/business being located
within a utility's territory. This situation
is not in the consumers' best interests be-
cause there is only one electrical provider
in each territory; thus, there are no fac-
tors which could influence competitive
pricing.
Also, the current arrangement allows
for big businesses and large-volume con-
sumers to benefit at the cost of the resi-
dential consumers. Consumers, albeit often
without knowing it, pay higher basic rates
in order to compensate the utility for ac-
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commodating the need of bigger custom-
ers through special discounts, incentives,
and pricing packages. In terms of cus-
tomer service, the residential consumers
obviously suffer since the prompt atten-
tion afforded big-volume users does not
trickle down to the average electricity
customer. This unfair situation is reme-
died by the PUC's "pool" approach which
ensures that the utility providing electric-
ity to the pool already is offering the low-
est competitive rates.
Another alternative floated by some
proponents of deregulation is one of "re-
tail wheeling." This plan would allow util-
ities to compete for customers through-
out the state without regulations protect-
ing the interests of the consumers. This
idea practically would defeat the whole
purpose of deregulation since average
consumers-already suffering under the
current system-would enter the market-
place at an immediate disadvantage; their
consumption patterns and electricity needs
still would not attract the attention of the
big, independent suppliers of electricity,
and thus consumers would have no means
to solicit competitive bids for service.
Again, the pool proposal pending before
the PUC addresses this disparity since
the very nature of the pool guarantees
that average consumers' collective en-
ergy needs will warrant competitive pric-
ing from the utilities.
In general, deregulation is good for
encouraging competition within a mar-
ketplace. But with a commodity such as
a public utility, complete and open com-
petition cannot exist in the name of pub-
lic policy. There must be some remaining
elements of government control and reg-
ulation in place to ensure that the rights
of citizens are not being violated. The
PUC has masterfully compromised alter-
natives without compromising principles
in its-current electricity deregulation pro-
posal. By implementing the pool con-
cept, the state would introduce a com-
petitive free market system to the elec-
tricity industry, while maintaining some
control over the delivery of the actual
electricity and services. If only the fed-
eral government had addressed deregu-
lation of the cable and telephone indus-
tries as well as the PUC is handling the
electricity issue, perhaps our cable and
phone rates would be lower too.
The PUC's approach also will assist
in the stabilizing of the electric utility in-
dustry. For example, one of the major
problems associated with the changes
witnessed in the airline industry was the
reduction of 22 major carriers in the na-
tion to a total of approximately eight.
The PUC's proposal offers an opportu-
nity for smaller, more rural electric and
municipal utilities in the state to grow
their grids and volume, as well as to ex-
pand their customer base. Heretofore
these utilities have been prohibited, both
legally and structurally, from entering
the territory of another electric utility.
Once all electricity providers in the state
have access to all of California's consum-
ers, the corresponding customer bases of
the respective utilities should reach more
balanced levels. This result only could
strengthen competition, and thus benefit
consumers.
Perhaps the most reassuring develop-
ment from the introduction of this pro-
posal is the sign from the PUC that it is
committed to being progressive, forward-
thinking, and objective. By converting the
electric industry from the current anti-con-
sumer relationship to that reflecting more
of a free market approach toward a utility
industry that has been regulated heavily for
over 100 years, the PUC will continue to
guard the public's safety and oversee our
electric service. It is appropriate that, as
we enter the 21st century, the Commis-
sion's latest plan to deregulate offers the
hope to residential customers originally
intended by regulation of the electric util-
ity industry.
Fortunately for California consumers,
there are public officials who act respon-
sibly, recognizing the concerns of the av-
erage citizen. All consumers currently dis-
enfranchised by the existing regulatory
framework should take heart in the an-
ticipation that change-for the better-is
near. The PUC wisely has proposed a plan
for providing electricity fairly, a plan
whose ramifications and shock waves
could carry beyond California's state
lines. As Californians and consumers, we
should be charged up for this momentous
undertaking, and we must ensure that the






id you ever stop to wonder why all
the major airlines seem to offer
virtually identical prices, despite
all the hype about deregulation creating a
more competitive market? Or why the air-
lines play "follow the leader" when it
comes to raising prices?
There are two dirty words for this prac-
tice: It's called "price-fixing." In fact,
several major airlines recently paid out
a hefty $458 million settlement on a
class action lawsuit alleging that the air-
lines fixed prices by signaling proposed
fare changes to each other via the com-
puter reservation system.
California consumers of electricity could
be facing a similar scenario if the state
Public Utilities Commission's "PoolCo"
proposal becomes the model for electric
deregulation in the state.
Proponents such as Southern Califor-
nia Edison claim PoolCo would create
lower electricity prices through competi-
tion. Under the PoolCo model, investor-
owned utility giants like SoCal Edison,
Pacific Gas & Electric, and San Diego
Gas & Electric would vie with indepen-
dent power producers by bidding into a
"pool" administered by a supposedly neu-
tral agency. That's like setting up a contest
between a pit bull and a Chihuahua: We
know from the start who is going to win.
PoolCo backers spin a tale of a highly
competitive energy marketplace, with
bidders shaving their prices close to their
costs and consumers reaping the bene-
fits. But this rosy view is far from the
reality the PUC's PoolCo model would
create. Instead, the PoolCo would allow
the biggest players-utilities and a hand-
ful of well-financed independents-to
maximize their profits and market share
through price-fixing, a la the airlines.
Meanwhile, consumers would be denied
the benefits of true competition.
Here's the rub: Edison and PG&E
control 55-60% of the power generation
capacity in the state. This skews the
game from the beginning. Because we
need their power to meet the bulk of the
state's electricity needs, the law of sup-
ply and demand dictates that the big util-
ities can name their price.
Independent suppliers also would bid
into the pool, but only a few-the larg-
est, most financially secure independent
power producers-would come up win-
ners. After this initial shakeout of winners
and losers, the dominant players could
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begin to collude, in effect, on the price
of the pool's power.
Because all the PoolCo players would
be fairly knowledgeable about each other's
costs, capital investment, and financial
strengths or weaknesses, the dominant
bidders could begin to signal each other
through the bidding process. As with the
airlines or the oil cartel, these key play-
ers could work together to raise the floor
price, and punish low-bidding newcom-
ers who disrupt their game.
But there is an even larger issue loom-
ing on the deregulation horizon. Which-
ever model is adopted eventually by the
PUC, how consumers fare will largely de-
pend on who is forced to pay for the util-
ities' high-cost nuclear powerplants and
how much.
The high cost of power from nuclear
plants such as PG&E's Diablo Canyon and
Edison's San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station is the driving force behind Cali-
fornia's high rates, which are 50% above
the national average. With power selling at
12 cents per kilowatt hour, Diablo Canyon
and San Onofre would not be players in a
truly competitive market for electricity (al-
though PoolCo would allow them to con-
tinue operating). Utilities say ratepayers
should bail utility investors out from under
these behemoths, and regulators have indi-
cated that they will go along with this plan.
If they do, rates will likely stay high no
matter which model of "competition" is
adopted. Utility investors should pay the
price for their past mistakes, not ratepay-
ers. After all, it was the investors who
chose to build plants in the first place.
Likewise, as long as the utilities continue
to own and control the bulk of the state's
electricity generating resources, PoolCo
will fail to lower prices through competi-
tion.
Instead of choosing between the two
plans advocated by the utilities-PoolCo
and so-called "direct access," which would
allow consumers to choose their utility
company, the PUC should consider op-
erations that would truly benefit consum-
ers.
Finally, the PUC must ensure that a
deregulated market for electricity is free
from utility domination and benefits all
consumers equally-even if that means
divesting the utilities from the business
of generating electricity.
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